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Abstract. This article mainly employs a traditional approach of textual analysis to 
open up a relatively neglected topic, the question of creativity in Durkheim’s work, 
but especially in Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse. It is also especially in 
a focus on his insistence on a sui generis social realm, while in the course of this 
exploring his use of terms such as “substratum”, “fusion”, and “synthesis”, as well 
as  examining  issues of  duality,  effervescence,  rhythms of  life  and  revolutions.  It 
concludes with his worries over a modern crisis and with his hope in the creative 
energies of effervescence to try to overcome it.





taires de la vie religieuse. L’article s’arrête notamment sur l’idée de Durkheim selon 
laquelle la société serait une réalité sui generis, explore l’usage qu’il fait de termes 
tels  que  « substrat »,  « fusion »  et  « synthèse »,  et  examine  les  problèmes  liés  à 
certaines notions auxquelles il a recours, comme celles de dualité, effervescence, 
rythmes et bouleversements de  la vie collective. L’article conclut sur  les  inquié-
tudes de Durkheim quant à une crise de  la modernité et  les espoirs qu’il place 
dans les énergies créatives de l’effervescence pour essayer de la surmonter.
Mots-clés :  créativité,  dualité,  effervescence,  Émile  Durkheim,  Formes élémentaires, 
rythme et révolution, spécificité des phénomènes sociaux.
CREATIVITY: 






Modern scholarship on Émile Durkheim’s work, life and times has blos-
somed in many ways, with new discoveries, new methods of research, new 
questions and new interests. But it still seems to me of value to pursue, as 
mainly done here, the rather more traditional approach of textual analysis, 
although I have taken advantage of the easy, indeed instant access to original 
editions thanks to modern digital technology, and although my concern is 
with opening up an issue that has perhaps been unduly neglected. Moreover, 
Durkheim himself never employed the term, créativité, which did not become 
current in French until the 1940s and 1950s1.
1. CREATIVITY IN LES FORMES
The issue of creativity can be seen as a key concern and problematic built 
into Durkheim’s sociology from the start. But a way to explore this is to begin 
with the approach to the issue in his last great work, Les Formes élémentaires de la 
vie religieuse (1912). The “creative”, like the “dynamic”, was one of the intellec-
tual buzzwords of the 1900s, and the work, with all its references to “creation”, 
“creating” and “creative power”, clearly involves some or other idea of creativity.
1.1. CAUSALITY AND CREATIVITY: BOOK III
There has been much interest among commentators on Les Formes in 
the discussion of causality and science that occurs at book III, chapter III, 
section III, p.518-528. But it is usually without noticing how it is followed, 
a mere ten pages later, with a discussion of creativity and art at book III, 
chapter IV, section II, p.537-548. If it is bad enough that this coverage of art 
has often been ignored, it is perhaps still worse that there has been hardly 
any attempt to surmount the gap of a few pages and link the work’s sections 
on science and art to ask about a basic question at stake in them, which is 
Durkheim’s view of the whole relation between causality and creativity.
1  See the entry on créativité in the online Le Trésor de la langue française.
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Given Durkheim’s commitment to sociology as science, it is understandable 
that there has been such interest in his account of causality, as in the work, for 
example, of Warren Schmaus (1994; 2004) and Anne Rawls (2004). However, 
the relation between causality and creativity is raised in a critique of both these 
authors by Susan Stedman Jones (2006), who emphasizes Durkheim’s concern 
with “the dynamic and creative nature of the categories that constellate around 
action—particularly causality, which involves the power to do” (ibid., p.64).
The slightly different strategy I wish to pursue here is to assume that 
Durkheim’s ideas of causality and creativity cannot just be the same, however 
much they overlap, and to look for what might help to distinguish his notion 
of creativity by starting from the case of art.
1.2. CREATIVITY IN ART
Although, like the discussion of science, the one on art is also quite short, it 
might still seem remarkable that it says nothing about beauty. Art, for Durkheim, 
instead comes across as above all an affair of the exercise and enjoyment of a 
creative power. In a passage that talks of “imagination”, “free creations of the 
mind” and “free combinations of thought and action”, art is characterized in 
terms of the key idea of a “surplus”, involving energies that sweep beyond the 
practically appropriate or necessary (Durkheim, 1912, p.544-546).
It is essential, of course, to interpret things in context, and to notice how 
this account is part of a chapter on “representative or commemorative rites”. 
These, it emerges, consist of more or less theatrical enactments of sacred myth, 
and so could also be discussed as sacred drama. As such, they mobilize and 
combine different particular varieties of art, especially varieties of performative 
and bodily art—music, dance, song, chant, verse, story-telling, special costumes, 
face-paintings and so on, but also and not least, the power of a whole atmos-
pheric mise-en-scène. Indeed, Durkheim’s star case of sacred drama comes, not 
from Baldwin Spencer and Francis James Gillen’s pioneering Australian ethno-
graphy of 1899, but from their follow-up study of 1904, and is a rite among the 
Warramunga people that they pick out as special. “It is not possible to convey in 
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words anything like an adequate idea of this series of ceremonies, which were 
the most impressive of any that we witnessed” (Spencer and Gillen, 1904, p.247).
Moreover, it is also the rite that Durkheim had already used as his star case of 
collective creative effervescence, in an account located in the chapter that consti-
tutes the physical as well as intellectual centrepiece of Les Formes, namely, book II, 
chapter VII. After describing the rite in some detail, he suggests it was the effer-
vescence stirred up in such social milieux that gave birth to “the religious idea” 
(Durkheim, 1912, p.313). But his theorization of effervescence at this key, reve-
latory point of the work highlights a combination of the power of assembly and 
the power of symbolism, with little or nothing explicit on the role of art until 
around two hundred pages later. So it might be wondered if, just as some of his 
official, programmatic statements attempt to play down physical, material embo-
diment, there is also an effort to marginalize art. Certainly, art is a pervasive, 
implicit presence in the centrepiece’s description of effervescence in Australia, 
if only thanks to Durkheim’s reliance on Spencer and Gillen. Not only do they 
conclude their ethnographies of 1899 and 1904 with long accounts of the art of 
the Australian peoples, but they also weave aesthetics into their ongoing, detailed 
ethnography itself, as, for example, in their interest in the powerful, striking art of 
the Arunta people’s churingas or of the Warramunga people’s ground-drawings, 
both of which had a central role in ritual. Yet on the one hand, Durkheim was 
quite capable of misrepresenting the available ethnography, as in his emphasis 
solely on a “mimetic” imitation of totems, contrary to all the evidence of cases 
such as the churingas and ground-drawings. On the other hand, when he finally 
gets round to the issue of art, he insists, for example, on “a poetry inherent in all 
religion” (ibid., p.546), and in this and other ways it becomes apparent from his 
work’s overall argument about collective creative effervescence that it fuses the 
power of assembly, the power of symbolism and the power of art.
But the upshot is not just that art, complete with its imaginativeness, free 
combinations of thought and action and energies of a surplus, is an integral 
element of the dynamics that help to give birth to “the religious idea”. As part 
of these effervescent processes, art is also part of the same dynamics that help 
to create and constitute social life itself.
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1.3. CREATIVITY IN GENERAL
Book I of Les Formes sets out to clear the ground for Durkheim’s own 
approach to religion by eliminating the two main rival theories, and a funda-
mental critique of both of these is that they assume the impossible, a “creation 
ex nihilo” (ibid., p.123). In book III, in the chapter that discusses science and 
causality after an account of something he calls the “mimetic” rite, yet another 
critique of a rival theory is that it fails to understand what is going on, since 
it fails to understand “the creation of something entirely new”, which is, in 
fact, “creation properly so-called” (ibid., p.509-510). So a question to ask of 
Durkheim himself is how, without assuming a creation out of nothing, he can 
identify a creation of the totally new.
Let us first note various different cases in which effervescence is his same 
key to things, as in the birth, already mentioned, of “the religious idea”. It is 
unclear what he means by this term. A link can nonetheless be made with 
one of the work’s basic claims, that religion is above all about elevating indi-
viduals to “a higher life” (ibid., p.592). Running the two arguments together, 
effervescence helps to generate religion, in processes that lift up and trans-
form embodied physical beings into spiritual, moral personalities.
Scenes of effervescent assembly are also the birthplace of a world of shared, 
concrete, material symbols, in an account in which these are integral to the 
formation of more abstract ideas, and in which they do not just express a pre-
existing social reality but help to create and constitute it. As Durkheim sums 
up, social life, in all its aspects and at all moments of its history, is only possible 
thanks to “a vast symbolism” (ibid., p.331). Put another way, however, it is the 
social life of collective effervescent times that, in involving the birth and mobi-
lization of symbols, generates and regenerates social life itself. Or in different if 
essentially similar terms, society can neither create nor recreate itself without, 
in the same effervescent action, creating a symbolism. 
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Effervescence is thus once again the key when, in the work’s conclusion, 
Durkheim makes the much quoted claim, emblazoned on the front cover of 
a modern paperback edition: “Une société ne peut ni se créer ni se recréer sans, du meme 
coup, créer de l’idéal” (ibid., p.603). As he goes on to write a few pages later, a day 
will come when our societies will once again experience moments of “creative 
effervescence”, complete with a surge of new ideals (ibid., p.611). However, the 
French Revolution constitutes his main modern instance of effervescence, and 
something fundamental is at stake in his earlier comment that the Revolution, 
with its launch of a new lay religion, was significant as an actual historical 
case in which society and its essential ideals became the object of a cult, 
without any “transfiguration” whatever (ibid., p.306). In the context, this clearly 
seems to mean it came without any “mystification” whatever, and to express 
Durkheim’s own deep commitment to ideals of enlightenment, a commitment 
it is important to remember even or especially in all his concern with efferves-
cent emotion, forests of symbols and an imaginative aesthetic “surplus”.
However, let us press on to a crucial passage that, in encapsulating an 
overall theme of the work, brings it towards a final, overall conclusion.
Entre le monde des sens et des appétits d’une part, celui de la raison et de la 
morale de l’autre, la distance est si considérable que le second semble n’avoir pu 
se surajouter au premier que par un acte créateur. —Mais attributer à la société 
ce rôle prépondérant dans la genèse de notre nature, ce n’est pas nier cette 
création ; car la société dispose précisément d’une puissance créatrice qu’aucun 
être observable ne peut égaler (ibid., p.637).
One of the points to note about this is not just that Durkheim emphasizes 
the creativity par excellence of society, whatever the case with a hidden, unob-
servable god, but that he expresses the very idea of creativity through talk of 
a “creative power”—as in the reference here to the reality of society’s puissance 
créatrice, or, earlier on, to the imagination of a god’s pouvoir créateur (ibid., p.420). 
Accordingly, something else to note is how his work involves the mobiliza-
tion of four basic terms, puissance/pouvoir/énergie/force, and that the first two of 
these elude capture by the solo English equivalent, “power”, while the overall 
discourse also very much includes “energy” and does not just reduce, as in 
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some commentaries, to a mechanistic, monochrome vocabulary of “force”. 
A follow-up point is that it would be a formidable task, which does not so far 
appear to have been undertaken, to go through Les Formes to analyze in detail 
its usage of this fourfold discourse. However, returning to the passage itself, 
it continues with an entirely general argument that, far from being a merely 
mystical operation, “all creation” is the product of a “synthesis”.
So it is necessary to ask what Durkheim means by “synthesis”, but the key 
question is what kind of solution it might offer to the issue of creativity itself. 
2. A PROBLEMATIC?
A route to misinterpreting Durkheim is to try to extract from his work an 
easy, undemanding, one-dimensional way of thinking. On the contrary, a charac-
teristic concern of his thought is with “antinomies”, “contradictions”, “oppo-
sitions”, “dualisms”, “dualities”. Perhaps the most famous of these involve his 
interest in the relations of the profane/sacred and the individual/collective. Less 
familiar concerns are with the immanent/transcendent and the animal/human. 
In any case, insofar as his overall thought and work constitute a developing, 
coherent “totality”, it is as much as anything the totality of a web of problematics.
The relationship between causality and creativity is part of this web, if 
only because it involves the antinomy, necessity/freedom, and if only because 
this becomes apparent when art is discussed in Les Formes in terms of “free 
creations of the mind”, “free combinations of thought and action”, and the 
energies of a “surplus”.
But although it might well be linked with this question of freedom and some 
sort of break in a causal chain, another aspect of things centres round the issue 
of how, without the mysteriousness of a creation from nothing, there can be a 
creation of something radically new. Indeed, it is especially here that Durkheim 
can run into accusations of incoherence, circularity and the petitio principii of 
accounts that already assume what they set out to understand and explain. Thus 
a long-running debate among commentators on Les Formes is about its view of the 
relationship of beliefs with rites and practices, and which of these is in the end 
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seen as fundamental and anchored in the other. However, the debate distracts 
attention not just from Durkheim’s insistent effort to anchor both of them in 
society, but from an argument about society as a creative power in which, right 
from the beginning of human life, it is the social that helps to create the social. 
Even though there is a focus, at this or that particular point in an unfolding 
story, on the role of assembly, or of symbolism and art, or of beliefs in the form 
of ideals, it remains the case that the basic overall concern is not only with the 
social but, also and not least, with society’s power to create and recreate itself.
It is superficial merely to complain about the argument’s logical incohe-
rence and circularity. This fails to address its roots in Durkheim’s whole world-
view and appeal to an irreducible, sui generis realm of the social. Indeed, a reason 
for approaching his thought as a web of problematics is to be found in his 
insistence on “breaks in continuity” and general opposition to a reductionist, 
one-dimensional commensurability of everything. In any case, to get to grips 
with his interest in creativity, it is essential to explore his concern with the 
dynamics of a sui generis realm of human social life.
3. A SUI GENERIS REALM OF THE SOCIAL
Throughout his sociological career, Durkheim was highly critical of 
attempts to reduce human social life to a matter of individual psychology or 
biology, and was adamant that it constituted, instead, a distinctive sui generis 
realm of its own. But although there are important continuities in the way he 
approached and argued for this claim, the development of his thought also 
involved significant differences. Thus he probably took around ten years to 
complete his main doctoral thesis, De la Division du travail social, eventually submit-
ted in March 1892, printed in time for circulation to members of the exami-
ning jury that met early the following year, and then published commercially 
as a book later in 1893. The thesis already mobilizes, like his last great work, 
a discourse of puissance/pouvoir/énergie/force. Indeed, a relatively early passage also 
mobilizes an argument about energies that, coming together in assembly, help 
to generate new, highly powerful, collective forces and emotions—although it 
refers, not to an effervescence of these energies but to a surexcitation, and not to 
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their synthesis but to their fusion (Durkheim, 1893a/1893b, p.105-106). Yet the 
argument is never then taken up in the rest of the thesis and developed in a 
sustained way to occupy a major, overall role. In particular, it is never taken up 
and developed into a positive message about the very idea of a creative power. 
On the contrary, the rare references to creation are virtually all negative in 
tone, as in the dismissal of theories that rely on “libres créations de l’initiative privée”, 
“créations artificielles” or a “création ex nihilo” (ibid., p.30, 157, 216, 288, 309).
But perhaps the main difference in approach concerns the issue of social 
evolution. Throughout his career, Durkheim pictured an early segmental society 
based on clans. In his thesis, however, this comes across as an overwhelmingly 
collectivist and static world. There is nonetheless, at some point, a “break in 
equilibrium” that sets off processes of unceasing change in which the divi-
sion of labour is the “motor of progress” and “everything happens mechani-
cally” (ibid., p.299). As a discussion of various cases had already emphasized, 
phenomena such as individualism do not date from this or that moment such 
as the French Revolution, but gradually arise and develop throughout history 
“without any break in continuity” (ibid., p.186).
An interest in the dynamics of long-term change remains a basic, integral 
part of the landscape of Les Formes. Yet as, for example, in book II, chapter IX, 
and its account of interlinked long-term changes in social organization and 
religious ideas, these dynamics are already very much at work in Durkheim’s 
early elementary society itself—now identified as a world based not only on 
clans but also on totemism, and approached through the paradigmatic case, 
not of an ancient, historically documented Israel, but of the modern ethno-
graphy of Australia. In once again looking for the main difference, however, 
it can be found in all the concern with special effervescent moments, even or 
especially as a key part of long-term dynamics.
This concern is bound up with the emergence, not just of a duality of two 
domains of the sacred and profane (Durkheim, 1898a, 1899), but with his 
eventual realization of the central theoretical importance of a duality of two 
times of the sacred and profane (Durkheim, 1907). In turn, what also emerged 
in writing up a manuscript of Les Formes was how this involved a double duality. 
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While one is an affair of alternating sacred and profane times in the rhythms of 
an established social calendar, the other is about rupture, in which the French 
Revolution is his star case of effervescence as a special, historically momentous 
and transformative time (see Durkheim, 1911a).
It is accordingly necessary, in exploring his insistence on an irreducible 
realm of the social, to look beyond the continuities of a calendar’s rhythms as 
well as of gradual change, and to bring in revolutions. However, an essential 
preliminary task is to ask about synthesis along with duality. 
3.1. SYNTHESIS/FUSION
As already noted, the conclusion to Les Formes comes with arguments 
not just about society as a creative power but about the basis of all crea-
tion in the scientifically intelligible, non-mystical operation of “synthesis” 
(Durkheim, 1912, p.637). In De la Division du travail, however, the same term is put 
to a negative use in a critique of grand philosophical “syntheses” of knowle-
dge that, with increasing scientific specialization, are merely vague, premature 
generalizations (Durkheim, 1893a/1893b, p.405, 408). Instead, and again as 
already noted, the thesis describes a case involving the effervescent creation of 
a new collective idea as a process of “fusion” (ibid., p.106). 
Even so, it uses this term in different ways, and in fact the main way is 
how, in the evolution towards a division of labour’s organically interlocking 
groups, there is an increasing “fusion” of traditional segments (ibid., p.244, 
285, 333, 414). Another way is concerned with the traditional, small-scale, 
homogeneous world of segmental society itself and how, since the differences 
between individuals are limited, their “fusion” in a common or collective 
consciousness can be more complete (ibid., p.111, 318).
A key development and articulation of Durkheim’s views came with his 
essay on individual and collective representations. His examination of the rela-
tion between these involved a specific focus on the issue of a sui generis social 
realm, above all in the essay’s final section (Durkheim, 1898b, p.293-302). 
Here, “synthesis” and “fusion” are equivalent terms in an argument about 
interlinkage and distinctiveness in which, just as physical embodiment forms 
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a substratum of individual psychic life, so it is that a mass of associated indivi-
duals constitutes the substratum of society. In one case, individual representa-
tions have roots in a “synthesis” of physiological elements that are transformed 
by the very fact of their “fusion”; in the other, collective representations have 
roots in a “synthesis” and “fusion” of individualistic elements that are trans-
formed in the very process itself (ibid., p.295-296).
Thus Durkheim is committed to an interlinkage of things in which, even 
or especially in arguing for sui generis orders of reality, he insists they can have 
only a relative autonomy (ibid., p.293). So a built-in ambiguity is how, at the same 
time as denying any “break of continuity” between these interlinked orders, 
he asserts that a higher realm is characterized by “suppleness, flexibility and 
contingence” compared with a substratum and indeed can become “free”, up to 
a point, from its roots in this (ibid., p.298-299). I would suggest, then, that a way 
of grasping the ambiguity is through the notion of a creative power that entails, 
if not a break in continuity, at least a break in deterministic chains of causation. 
Durkheim himself goes on to discuss how striking examples of what is at 
stake in his argument can be found in “the evolution of religion”. Collective repre-
sentations can cut loose from close initial links with a substratum, to combine 
with one another in all kinds of new “syntheses” and take on “a life of their own” 
that is more or less autonomous rather than just a product of “social structure”; 
although it is no doubt impossible to understand the formation of the Greek or 
Roman pantheon independently of the formation of the city, the gradual merging 
of an ancient segmental society’s clans and so on, things such as the “luxuriant 
growth of myths and legends” are constructions of religious thought itself rather 
than simply phenomena “determined by social morphology” (ibid., p.299). 
So this helps to support the suggestion about an idea of creativity that breaks 
up causal chains. However, various other points might now be made, starting 
with how the essay’s interest in the evolution of religion is part of a more gene-
ral evolutionary perspective. This surfaces explicitly in a remark about different 
“stages” of reality (ibid., p.298). But what could seem implicit in the whole imagery 
of “substrata” is a concern with different archaeological layers that have gradually 
built up and become superimposed on one another. Accordingly, a question that 
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can arise is whether or not the logic of the essay’s argument for a sui generis social 
realm depends on some kind of reductionist human history, in which a substra-
tum of social life came first, eventually giving birth to social life itself.
At least the essay is clear that this substratum is in no way an affair of 
isolated atoms. It is emphasized, on the contrary, that it consists of a set or tota-
lity—an ensemble—of associated individuals (ibid., p.293). There is nonetheless an 
ambiguity in how it is further characterized. On the one hand, it is first descri-
bed in terms of a system or structure of relations that Durkheim regarded as a 
matter of social morphology; on the other, it is then also described in terms of 
the actions and reactions between the particular individual minds—consciences 
élémentaires—that make up society (ibid., p.293-294). The first characterization is 
very much rooted in the sociological landscape of Durkheim’s thesis, complete 
with its interest, surfacing in the essay’s example of religion, in a gradual evolu-
tionary merging or fusion of the segments typical of early social structures. 
The second characterization could also still be rooted in an evolutionary pers-
pective. But it might especially seem to evoke the case in which his thesis 
focuses on the action and reaction of individual consciousnesses in assembly 
and their effervescent fusion. A difficulty with this interpretation, however, is 
that his essay comes without anything at all on effervescence, either as word or 
idea. So this is a point at which to return to ask about Les Formes.
An announcement early on in the work is that religious life, wherever it is 
observed, always has a definite group as its “substratum” (Durkheim, 1912, p.61). 
Things get more complicated in the five hundred or so pages that follow, and 
a problematic finally tackled in the conclusion is whether this substratum of 
religious life is to be found in the actual world, where evil and injustice often 
reign supreme, or in collective representations and ideals of the good society 
(ibid., p.600). In any case, a rather different concern running through the work 
is with how the body, bodily parts and other physical phenomena constitute the 
“material substratum” of sacred things such as the soul and sacred forces such as 
mana (see, e.g., ibid., p.95, 328, 339, 348). Moreover, it is the body that at the same 
time constitutes a material substratum of the individual (see, e.g., ibid., p.23, 521). 
Yet what about social life itself? After all, another early announcement is that 
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“society is a sui generis reality” (ibid., p.22). What, then, is its substratum, and how 
is this transcended through processes of synthesis-cum-fusion?
The point about a sui generis social realm is immediately linked with collec-
tive representations and how they are irreducible to the individual since they 
are a product of many different minds in an immense collaboration “not only 
in space but also across time” and involving the accumulated experience of 
“long generations” (ibid., p.22-23). So it is worth repeating that evolutionary 
concerns remain integral to Les Formes, while nonetheless taking on board all 
the new emphasis placed on effervescence, as with the issue of religion’s subs-
tratum and whether it is constituted by the actual or an ideal social world. 
The solution, it turns out, involves the creation not only of the sacred but 
also of the ideal through the same social dynamic, an intensification of 
collective life in times of assembly, generating “a state of effervescence that 
alters the conditions of psychic activity” (ibid., p.602-603). This concern with 
assembly and effervescence might be why a passage that soon follows still 
insists that “social life depends on its substratum”, but now seems to down-
play an older view in which a substratum of associated individuals is about 
morphology rather than an interaction of minds, and instead highlights how 
collective consciousness is the product of “a sui generis synthesis of individual 
consciousnesses” (ibid., p.605). Or, in a variant of this formula, “society is a 
synthesis of human consciousnesses” (ibid., p.615). Even so, another new deve-
lopment is how the work’s interest in effervescence is in fact linked with a 
reinvigoration of the issue of social and religious life’s “material substratum”.
In the central chapter of Les Formes, the detailed ethnography of efferves-
cence in Australia is followed by various interlinked theoretical discussions, not 
least an account of symbolism. In turn, the chapter’s final section builds on this 
account with a series of key generalizations. A collective sentiment can only 
become conscious of itself “by fixing on a material object”, a process in which 
the sentiment “participates in the nature of this object, as well as the other 
way round”, so that it is through social needs that apparently distinct notions 
are “fused together”, and “social life makes this fusion possible through the 
great mental effervescence it brings about” (ibid., p.339). Durkheim had already 
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maintained, in leading up to the account of symbolism, that ideas require 
anchorage in “material things”, but had immediately remarked that “the role 
of matter is reduced, here, to a minimum” (ibid., p.326). He had also gone on 
to argue that sacredness, not being inherent in the nature of a bewildering 
multitude of different things invested with it, is merely “added” to these and 
“superimposed” on the material, empirical world (ibid., p.328). Moreover, it is a 
formula he often went on to repeat. For example, “the world of representations 
in which social life unfolds is added to its material substratum, far from arising 
from it” (ibid., p.389). This can seem difficult to reconcile with an effervescent 
“fusion” of collective ideas and material symbols, or their mutual “participa-
tion” in one another. But a deeper problem is its failure to recognize how, in 
Durkheim’s own actual account of effervescence and its creation of extraordi-
nary collective energies through assembly, symbolism and art, an ineliminable 
role is played by the embodied individual.
It remains the case that, even if in changes of line over a material substra-
tum, its transcendence by social and religious life is seen as entailing greater 
freedom. In regard to individuals, collective forces bring them a relative auto-
nomy as persons, in loosening the hold of the senses and developing a power 
“to think and act through concepts” (ibid., p.389). In regard to collective forces 
themselves, the energies of effervescence and its synthesis of associated indi-
viduals create “a whole world of feelings, ideas and images” that does not just 
have its own laws but that has “such great independence” that it sometimes 
plays around in ways that have little or no serious aim except the pleasure of 
affirming itself in them (ibid., p.605). This can recall the remark, in the essay 
on individual and collective representations, about religious life’s luxurious 
growth—végétation luxuriante—of myths and legends, and indeed a note refers 
readers to this earlier essay. But the note also refers, perhaps even more signi-
ficantly, to an earlier section in Les Formes itself. On looking it up, this is the 
work’s discussion of art, of its role in social and religious life, and of its ener-
gies of an effervescent “surplus”, complete with “free creations of the mind” 
and “free combinations of thought and action”. 
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Let us now turn to Durkheim’s concern with duality, a concern running 
through the whole of Les Formes and its view of an irreducible domain of human 
social life. It was then taken up again in a paper on religion and the duality of 
human nature (Durkheim, 1913), but also and more famously in an article the 
dualism of human nature, where it is once more an integral part of an account 
that interlinks a sui generis social realm, effervescence and the “singularly fertile 
and creative psychic process called fusion, the communion of a plurality of indi-
vidual consciousnesses in a common consciousness” (Durkheim, 1914, p.217).
3.2. DUALITY
“Duality” is the term used throughout Les Formes, and I have been unable to 
locate in it even a single occurrence of “dualism”. The situation is slightly diffe-
rent with the discussion paper of 1913, where “duality” is again the term used 
throughout, except that there is now a reference to an “ancient dualism”, followed 
by a critique of metaphysical theories that fail to explain how two antagonistic 
worlds “unite and interpenetrate”, and that accordingly leave the impression of an 
antagonism between two entities existing entirely independently and outside one 
another, which “renders their marriage unintelligible” (Durkheim, 1913, p.72). 
This suggests that the idea defended in Les Formes as well as in the discussion 
paper involves a sociological concern with a relational duality, as against the meta-
physics of an essentialist dualism. So it is perhaps ironic that Durkheim has been 
so often accused of precisely such an essentialist, metaphysical dualism, not least 
by sociologists and anthropologists who seem unaware of his talk of duality, and 
overreliant on a single brief text, his article on a dualism. Indeed, setting aside the 
article’s title and reading through the actual text, again it mainly talks of duality 
rather than dualism, and again it attacks metaphysical theories that, in setting up 
two entirely separate worlds, “make their marriage impossible” and are incapable 
of understanding how they “unite and interpenetrate in a way that gives birth to 
the hybrid and contradictory beings that we are” (Durkheim, 1914, p.215).
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In my view, the best, most informed and also most incisive analysis as 
well as wider contextual discussion of the 1914 essay has been provided by 
Giovanni  Paoletti (2009; 2012). In negotiating the complexities of the essay’s 
concern with doubleness as a belief, as a fact and as an outcome to explain, he 
makes a number of terminological proposals. One is just to accept “dualism” as 
an obvious way of referring to belief in at least some kind of doubleness, whate-
ver it might be. Another, for want of a better alternative, is also to use “dualism” 
to describe a substantivist doubleness of two self-standing, heterogeneous orders 
of reality that might exist in combination, but essentially exist independently, 
outside or before any such combination. It is then possible to reserve “duality” for 
a relational doubleness, involving a primal, irreducible correlation of two terms 
that can only be defined through reference to each other, and that describe essen-
tial elements of a relationship that cannot exist independently of this relationship, 
but are integrally and internally bound up with it (see Paoletti, 2012, p.63-66). So 
while observing the presence of all these various approaches, the conclusion of 
his textual analysis of the 1914 essay is that its “prevailing idea of doubleness is 
what we have called “relational” doubleness” (ibid., p.68).
What I now wish to show is how, just as relational doubleness is explicitly the 
idea put forward in the 1913 paper on duality, it is also the idea at work in Les Formes 
itself. Thus the introduction to the work provides an early intimation of its interest 
in a “duality” of the individual-collective (Durkheim, 1912, p.22-27), but without 
giving away if it is a relational doubleness. However, it might well seem it is 
nothing of the kind, judging from the work’s opening chapter on the definition 
of religious phenomena. This offers an account in which the separation of the 
sacred and profane is not just relative but “absolute”, involves a thoroughgoing 
“antagonism” along with a difference in their very “essence”, and sets up a need 
to explain why there has been a more or less universal belief in such “hete-
rogeneous and incomparable worlds”, although there is apparently no basis in 
empirical experience for “so radical a duality” (ibid., p.53-58). The only hint of 
an alternative picture is a remark that the sacred would be “good for nothing” 
unless it influenced and interacted with the profane (ibid., p.55). But as the work 
gets going in earnest, this alternative becomes increasingly evident.
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An early indication of such a development is the attack on theories unable 
to explain a duality of two beings within us that does not exclude but implies 
their “profound unity and intimate interpenetration” (ibid., p.79)—while also 
continuing to attack theories unable to explain how humanity could have arri-
ved at the idea of a duality of “two categories of radically heterogeneous and 
incomparable things” (ibid., p.120). Moving on to the work’s central chapter, 
this includes key accounts of effervescence, symbolism and so on, but also 
includes a wholly general point about religious forces and how they combine a 
moral and material character: “the duality of man and nature does not preclude 
their unity”, and “physical and moral forces, while distinct, are closely rela-
ted” (ibid., p.319, n.1). Moreover, this helps to prepare the way for the argu-
ment, already noted, in which ideas require anchorage in concrete, material 
symbols, and the fusion of these two elements with one another comes about 
through collective effervescence (ibid., p.339). In the following chapter, it turns 
out that the duality of body and soul is “in no way absolute”, and that there is 
not only a “close solidarity” between them, but even a “partial overlapping” 
(ibid., p.347). However, what also turns out is that an altogether crucial duality 
is within the soul itself, and it often goes unnoticed how Durkheim’s account 
draws on a traditional religious duality of immanence-transcendence. Society, 
like the “totemic principle”, mana and god, is both a vast transcendent power 
going beyond the individual and an inner immanent energy grounded within 
human lives, while the soul is a different expression of the same duality, 
constituting everyone’s own particular spark of the divine. In Durkheim’s 
Australia, then, the totemic principle is “immanent in each of the members of 
the clan”, yet, “in penetrating inside individuals, it is inevitable that it is itself 
individualized” (ibid., p.356). But also and more universally, the “impersonal 
forces that arise from the collectivity” can only become established through 
their incorporation within individual consciousnesses, “where they are them-
selves individualized”, and this is not in two different processes, but “in two 
different aspects of the same process” (ibid., p.382).
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In sum, in the developing arguments in Books I and II, one of the main 
things to emerge is a relational duality in which the very influence and indeed 
existence of collective forces depends on their internalization-cum-individualiza-
tion—a message repeated in the work’s overall conclusion (ibid., p.605). The deve-
loping arguments in Book III involve a similar, though also in a way an opposite 
movement. Like the work’s opening chapter on the definition of religious pheno-
mena, things kick off in a somewhat dramatic—even melodramatic—fashion. 
Apparently, there is not just a relative but an absolute “break in continuity” that 
divides the sacred from the profane, and an essential job of ritual is to keep these 
domains separate through taboos and prohibitions (ibid., p.428). However, it soon 
turns out that it is also a job of ritual to overcome such separation, to prepare 
profane things and beings for participation in the sacred, and, above all, to join 
individuals together in communion with one another and with the divine, as 
described in the book’s three central chapters on the great “positive” rites of 
religion. A final chapter then concludes by summarizing a message of the book 
itself, which is that the job of religion, in all its forms, is the individual’s emanci-
pation from egoistic impulses and uplift to “a higher life” (ibid., p.592).
So while a move towards a relational duality takes place in both parts of the 
work, it goes in opposite although complementary ways, in that one is espe-
cially about the integral dependence of collective forces on their individuali-
zation to have any impact and power at all, the other about the individual’s 
integral dependence on society for participation in an intellectual and moral, 
recognizably human life. Together, these arguments have far-reaching impli-
cations for Durkheim’s entire argument about a distinctive, sui generis social 
realm and the dynamics of effervescent fusion. If these dynamics help to create 
society, it is in helping to create the individual as a recognizably human perso-
nality. However, there is another corollary. Thanks to a collective effervescence 
of associated individuals, but also thanks to a relational duality in which these 
already lead distinctively human lives, the social is already more or less fully 
implicated from the start in the creation and recreation of the social itself.
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A boring, theoretically unadventurous and superficial option is just to 
dismiss this as a case of Durkheim’s irremediable circularity. An alternative is 
to imagine an equivalent of a cosmological “big bang”, in which a whole rela-
tional dynamic somehow got going in a creation ex nihilo that kicked off human 
history. Or it is possible, instead of abandoning Durkheim’s opposition to any 
mysterious creation out of nothing, to give up on his rigid distinction between 
human and other animals, and to root his dynamic of social life in processes 
already taking place among humanity’s ancestors. I have explored the first of 
these alternatives elsewhere (Watts Miller, 2012, p.128-129), and do not have 
time, here, to explore the second. But I think it is important, in trying to grasp 
Durkheim’s ideas and to take these seriously, not just to cut out the interest in 
early evolutionary origins that he shared with his contemporaries and pursued 
throughout his career. It nonetheless remains necessary, even in attempts to 
avoid the issue of origins, to ask about revolutions rather than only rhythms in 
order to understand his dynamic of the creation and recreation of social life. 
CONCLUSION 
Rhythms and Revolutions
What might be seen as an ambiguity is built into the whole project of Les 
Formes, since its interest in the basic, early and elementary is at the same time a 
way of trying to uncover the basic, continuing and elemental. A trap is just to 
read off from Durkheim’s Australia that it is also his picture of basic universals, 
and although his work comes with clear warnings against doing this, he might 
still seem vague on a range of issues about what is specific to Australia and 
what is universal. However, his cases of the universal certainly include a need 
in every society to assemble but also to disperse, since “it cannot remain in 
session forever”, and a response to this need is a “regular alternation of sacred 
and profane times” (Durkheim, 1912, p.499). So this way of formulating things 
leaves room for his interest both in momentous, revolutionary times and in the 
rhythms of established social calendar. 
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What should also be noted is how the passage concludes by emphasizing 
Australia as an extreme case, in which the rhythms of social life involve a 
contrast between alternating ordinary and special times that, as societies deve-
lop, becomes increasingly difficult to accommodate (ibid., p.500). Indeed, perhaps 
things have gone so far nowadays that an alternation between different times is 
increasingly replaced by a calendar in which they run in parallel, and alongside 
an uninterrupted, non-stop slot for the routine business of economic and domes-
tic life there is also an uninterrupted, non-stop slot for special gatherings, games, 
ceremonies, rites and festivals of all kinds. True enough, a necessary implica-
tion might be different particular individual timetables within the same collec-
tive calendar. But this very point helps to bring out cause for concern about an 
anomic individualization of time within the shell of a collective calendar.
Coming back to the text of 1912 itself, it has already been argued that it still 
involves an interest in gradual processes of long-term evolutionary change, but it 
can now be added that these might well operate in ordinary rather than only in 
special ritual times, or, more bluntly, that they necessarily operate throughout and 
across the rhythms of routine and ritual times. An example involves Durkheim’s 
argument about an underlying evolutionary logic at work in Australia, in which 
gradually developing structural changes together with their crystallization in 
initiation rites helped to generate the idea of a high god, endowed with a creative 
power and a prestige “well above that of other heroes of mythology” (ibid., p.420). 
This then links with an account in which he sees a high god recognized by diffe-
rent clans as a “synthesis” of all totems of these clans, and a personification of 
the tribe as a whole (ibid., p.421). In turn, the underlying logic at stake in this is 
how, far from being a recent foreign import, the idea of an overall god shared by 
different Australian peoples arises from an internal “internationalist” dynamic 
going on among these peoples themselves (ibid., p.422). 
Accordingly, his argument seems to me to have at least two corollaries. One 
is the need to abandon any impression he gives that everyday life in Australia is 
so routine and monotonous that little or nothing of significance takes place in 
it. The other is the need to revise his apparent generalization that the essential 
job of a calendar’s special ritual times is just to reinforce and maintain an exis-
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ting collective consciousness. This said, let us move on to the key role played in 
Les Formes by the effervescence and creativity of historically momentous times 
and to the French Revolution as Durkheim’s star case of these. 
It seems to me that, compared with his talk of “synthesis”, his talk of “fusion” 
has much greater explanatory as well as evocative power, through its image of 
the intense, transformative energies of a cauldron or melting-pot. This helps to 
get across how, without a creation from nothing, there can still be a creation of 
the radically new. What is at the same time at stake is how it is a creation entai-
ling a break in a mechanistic causal chain and a degree of indeterminacy and 
freedom about the outcome of its effervescence. The question, in other words, is 
how limited or far-ranging this creative freedom might be, a question with roots 
in Durkheim’s belief—as in his thesis, and again in Les Formes—in underlying 
logics at work in social worlds but also in the overall evolution of humanity itself. 
His star case of the French Revolution helps to reveal at least two of these 
dynamics. Or rather, perhaps, they are two aspects of the same basic dynamic. 
One is a movement towards an ethic of each different individual’s same funda-
mental moral status and sacredness as a person. The other is a movement away 
from mystification towards enlightenment and, through science, education but 
also a whole wider public and shared civic culture, towards the ideal of a trans-
parent society. It is of course possible to argue that, just as profound inequali-
ties are inevitable, so there will always be fogs of mystification of one kind or 
another. Yet it would itself be a mystification, indeed a travesty, to represent 
these as Durkheim’s own views. This is evident enough from his career as 
whole. But it is also crystal clear from a posthumously published talk he gave 
in 1914 on Les Formes, and what it was all about (Durkheim, 1919).
The conclusion to his talk describes an ongoing crisis, then ends on a note 
of hope about its eventual resolution. Moreover, worries over a profound if 
nonetheless passing malaise of modern society had agitated him for some time, 
especially in his thesis as well as in a new, revised version (Durkheim, 1902) 
and its subsequent republication (Durkheim, 1911b), which appeared just a year 
before Les Formes and was the edition of La Division du travail cited in it. But it also 
seems worth noting that worries over a modern crisis concerned him throughout 
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his career, from his first sociological publication (Durkheim, 1885) to a recently 
rediscovered article of 1917 on the politics of the future (Durkheim,  1999). 
Returning to Les Formes, it is significant that, like the conclusion to his talk about 
it, a passage in its own overall conclusion first describes a crisis in which “we 
are going through a period of transition and moral mediocrity”, then looks 
forward to an upsurge, as in the Revolution, of a new moment of creative effer-
vescence to help to overcome it (Durkheim, 1912, p.610-611).
But although the explicit focus in all this is on overcoming the crisis through 
an effervescent renewal of idealism, what is also at stake is the need for a new 
organization of society through which to work towards the enactment of this 
idealism. In Durkheim’s long-running worries about modern pathologies and 
malaise, a recurrent criticism he made of the Revolution was its failure to deve-
lop the organization required by its ideals, and the organization he especially 
had in mind involved a new network of intermediate groups, linking the indi-
vidual with wider society and indeed helping to constitute society itself. Thus 
there is a strong case for reformulating his talk of intermediate groups and 
discussing them, as in the work of Anne Rawls, as constitutive practices. What 
I would add, however, is that a key need is to grasp the continuing relevance 
and seriousness of a crisis in which, as he saw it, there has been a sustained, 
long-term hollowing out of intermediate groups, and a way of doing this is to 
understand it as a hollowing out of the constitutive practices of society itself.
Perhaps a rebuilding of such groups and practices might develop just through 
gradual processes of reform within the current socio-political system, and without 
the extraordinary energies of the new moment of creative effervescence envi-
saged by Durkheim. Another possibility is that the crisis will just go on, since this 
moment will never come. Or it might turn out to be an effervescent reinvigoration 
of ideals of inequality, whether or not together with revitalized clouds of mystifica-
tion. Even a relative freedom and indeterminacy comes, after all, with its risks. But 
it seems especially appropriate, in the centenary of Durkheim’s death, to end with 
a general overall remark that goes beyond theoretical arguments about a sui generis 
social realm, duality and so on. Underlying all these, Durkheim seems to have 
held on to an obstinate hope in the creative energies inherent in human social life. 
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